If Russia is struggling in Ukraine, why should Europe still be worried?
Russia can use smaller-scale hybrid methods — special forces, local proxies and covert interventions — to destabilise neighbouring states without deploying its entire army, and frequent probing increases the risk of miscalculation that could draw in NATO.
How could changes in US policy affect European security regarding Russia?
If US support weakens, Kremlin planners may judge Europeans more vulnerable; uneven or limited NATO responses to crises (e.g., in the Baltics) could erode Article 5 credibility and enable Russian operations that stop short of full invasion.
What recent signs suggest Russia may be preparing for more assertive moves near NATO's borders?
Moves such as suspending rail links into the Baltics and Finland, tighter border and transport restrictions, and increased maritime probing signal preparations or capability shifts that raise regional tensions.
Could domestic pressures inside Russia change Putin’s behaviour?
Economic pain and fuel shortages are creating public discontent; Putin may respond to internal pressure by rallying the population with external actions or by sustaining militarised policies to preserve regime stability.
How has the balance changed on the battlefield and what does that mean for negotiations?
Ukraine has won strategic levers — mid-range strikes, supply-line disruption and pressure on Crimea — giving it more bargaining power and the option to press gains, which complicates prospects for a negotiated settlement.
Why are UK defence spending plans important to this debate?
Credible deterrence depends on adequate, transparent defence investment; underfunded or ill-accounted plans risk weakening Britain’s ability to contribute meaningfully to NATO and to deter future Russian coercion.