Video Summary
The U.S. is pressuring allies to label Iran’s IRGC and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations amid a campaign to brand Iran the top state sponsor of terrorism.
Kiriakou argues many Iran-backed groups began as resistance movements (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis) and shouldn't be simplistically labeled 'terrorist.'
The CIA and U.S. allies have long funded and armed proxy groups that used terrorism as a tactic, raising charges of hypocrisy.
The MEK has a violent, cult-like history but was delisted and cultivated support in Washington through lobbying and political backing.
Targeted assassinations tend to strengthen hardliners and provoke retaliatory violence rather than deter threats.
Kiriakou argues no: many Iran-backed groups began as national liberation or resistance movements and using the terrorism label selectively ignores historical and political nuance.
The discussion highlights long-standing U.S. use of proxies, covert arming, and backing of violent groups (e.g., Contras, anti-Castro groups, death squads), suggesting hypocrisy in singling out Iran.
The MEK has a history of violence and cult-like leadership, was sheltered by Saddam Hussein, but cultivated bipartisan Washington support through lobbying and was delisted in 2009.
Kiriakou says claims of Iranian sleeper cells inside the U.S. are unfounded and often fabricated; Iranian intelligence capabilities are described as limited and overstated in some claims.
The guests warn assassinations typically strengthen hardline elements, provoke revenge, and reduce prospects for diplomatic solutions—creating cycles of escalation.
"A State Department cable signed by Marco Rubio has ordered U.S. diplomats to pressure allies to designate Iran's Revolutionary Guard and Lebanon's Hezbollah as terrorist organizations."
The U.S. government, through a cable issued by Marco Rubio, is directing diplomats to encourage foreign counterparts to label Iran's Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah as terrorist entities.
This diplomatic push reflects a broader campaign aimed at framing Iran as the leading state sponsor of terrorism, stemming from its support for various militant groups throughout the Middle East, such as Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in occupied Palestine.
"Hamas was formed as part of the Palestinian struggle for liberation when the secular leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization failed to deliver on its promises."
There is a critical distinction between groups described as terrorist organizations and those formed out of resistance to occupation or oppression.
Hamas originated not as a terrorist group but as a response to unmet political aspirations for a Palestinian state, emerging when the secular leadership faltered.
Similarly, Hezbollah arose as a reaction to Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, highlighting the complexities of labeling resistance movements purely as terrorism.
"The CIA has long funded and armed groups that use terrorism as a tactic."
The discussion points to the hypocrisy of the U.S. government in labeling certain groups as terrorists while engaging in similar practices through covert support and funding.
Historical references include CIA-backed groups that committed acts of terrorism, such as the anti-Castro organizations that targeted civilian aircraft and various death squads in Latin America, illustrating a consistent pattern of covert, violent intervention that draws parallels to Iran's support for its proxies.
"The generally agreed-upon definition of terrorism is the act of instilling violence in the civilian population for the purpose of creating terror for a political purpose."
Terrorism is defined in a way that separates national liberation movements from conventional terrorist acts, emphasizing the political nuance behind such classifications.
John Kiriakou argues that supporting groups fighting for liberation should not automatically equate to acts of terrorism, suggesting that a more nuanced understanding of these terms is necessary.
"If we were to hold the Saudis to the same definition, they would be at least as guilty as the Iranians."
Kiriakou asserts that U.S. allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, have engaged in actions that could equally be classified as terrorism under the same definitions applied to Iran.
This critique underscores the inconsistency in how different nations are scrutinized, suggesting that the terrorism designation lacks credibility when selectively applied based on political convenience.
"The Mujahedin-e Khalq is a terrorist group that has been around since the 1960s, characterized more as a cult than a traditional political group."
The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), initially engaged in resistance against the Shah of Iran, has a controversial past that complicates its present status and relationships with foreign powers, especially its designation as a terrorist group by various governments.
Kiriakou emphasizes the necessity of understanding the historical context of such groups, including their actions against American officials, to fully grasp the motivations and implications of their formations.
"The Mujahedin-e Khalq was originally set up as a communist group, but it wasn't really communist; it was more of a cult."
The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) was a group originally founded with communist ideologies but devolved into a cult-like organization. This group was based in camps within northeastern Iraq under Saddam Hussein, who provided support including a radio station for their propaganda efforts against Iran.
Leadership of the MEK transitioned when its founder disappeared under mysterious circumstances, with his wife, Maryam Rajavi, taking over. She initiated diplomatic communications with the West, aiming to gain international favor.
In 2009, during Barack Obama’s presidency, the U.S. government lifted the terrorism designation against the MEK, influenced notably by Hillary Clinton and high-profile lobbying efforts. This led to the MEK being embraced within U.S. political circles, transforming their image despite their violent past.
"Now we have this terrorist, this murderer, this cult leader, Maryam Rajavi, arriving in Washington and being treated as a conquering hero. Why? Because she hates the Ayatollahs."
The MEK was adept at cultivating relationships with influential Washington figures, hiring lobbyists across party lines to bolster their legitimacy. This strategy proved successful as they gained support in Washington and broader Western nations.
U.S. motivations in the region pivoted around shared animosity towards Iran, particularly the Ayatollahs. However, this alliance raises concerns about the implications of endorsing a group with a violent and tumultuous history.
"I can't tell you how many emails I've received from people in such disparate locations... asking, 'Is it true that there are Iranian terrorist cells embedded in my city?' No, it's not true."
The narrative of Iranian terrorist sleeper cells in the U.S. is debunked as a fabricated claim likely promoted by Israeli intelligence to sway American public opinion towards aggressive action against Iran. This misinformation aims to foster justifications for potential military intervention.
A broader observation reveals that the MEK, now purportedly an ally of American interests, is reported to have financial support from Israeli sources, signaling a complex intertwining of foreign policies fueled by mutual hostile sentiments towards Iran.
"The United States, no matter its intent, will never be seen as a liberator; it will be seen as an invader and an occupier."
The historical context of U.S. interventions has fostered a perception among Iranians of the U.S. as an invading force rather than a liberator, making them more likely to resist foreign influence.
The discussion highlights the disparity between U.S. and Israeli goals in the region, with Israel reportedly pursuing strategies aimed at destabilizing Iran to create chaotic internal conflicts that distract from external threats.
"It is those failed states that really spawn terrorist groups."
Failed states have become fertile grounds for the emergence of terrorist organizations. The assertion is that chaos and instability contribute significantly to the breeding of such groups, as seen in various countries throughout the Middle East.
The perspective on Israeli strategic interests reveals a tendency to foster chaos in neighboring countries like Syria and Iraq, perceiving it as a buffer against direct threats to Israel. The belief persists that divided and weakened states benefit Israel’s security posture.
"We could have cooperated with the Iranians on counterterrorism, on counter-proliferation, even counter-narcotics."
A discussion of past opportunities for collaboration between the U.S. and Iran suggests a historical pattern of diplomatic neglect. Instances arose where cooperation could have effectively addressed mutual concerns, including counter-terrorism strategies against shared threats.
Personal accounts illustrate moments of direct engagement with Afghan farmers, revealing the complexities of U.S. involvement in regional drug policies and how miscommunication can further complicate relationships between nations.
"Afghanistan produces 93% of the world's heroin, almost all of which goes to Iran and Russia, and we want them to be addicted to heroin. It weakens their societies."
The speaker recounts a past conversation with a contact who highlighted the strategic interests in promoting drug addiction as a method to destabilize adversarial countries such as Iran and Russia.
The discussion emphasizes that this tactic was utilized to weaken these societies, suggesting a long-held policy of fostering dependency through drug trade rather than seeking diplomatic engagement.
The escalating fentanyl crisis in the U.S. is paralleled with historical actions, pointing out that the fentanyl causing widespread addiction is produced in China, and that there is an insinuation China benefits from this societal degradation as well.
"Targeted assassination campaigns inevitably strengthen the most fanatic elements of society."
The notion is expressed that targeted killings, such as those of Iranian military leaders and scientists, often bolster hardline factions rather than diminish them.
This creates a vicious cycle where violent reprisals and hardening ideologies lead to a reduced willingness to engage in diplomatic negotiations, further escalating tensions.
The mention of personal experiences with figures from Hamas illustrates how assassinations can lead to the rise of even more radical successors, highlighting a pattern where violence begets further violence.
"Anyone who criticizes Israel in any way is labeled anti-Semitic, and this serves to silence dissent."
The dialogue addresses the troubling use of the anti-Semitism label to marginalize criticism against Israeli policies, pointing out that this tactic is becoming less effective as more people are recognizing its misuse.
There's an assertion that individuals, even within the Israeli Defense Forces, have learned to label dissenters automatically without critical examination of their arguments, creating a culture that stifles open discourse.
This development is noted as having potential backlash, as the broader public is beginning to challenge these labeling tactics, suggesting a shifting sentiment regarding acceptable criticism of Israel.
"Iranian intelligence is considered one of the less effective services."
Discussing the capabilities of Iranian intelligence, it is expressed that their service struggles with training and resources, primarily relying on limited support from Russia and China.
It is concluded that Iran's intelligence operations are largely self-sustained but lack the sophistication found in more capable agencies, leading to a weakened strategic stature on the global stage.
"Pakistan actively supports a myriad of terrorist groups while being seen as an ally."
A comparison is drawn between Iran and Pakistan, emphasizing that while Iran is often labeled as the "world's leading state sponsor of terrorism," other nations like Pakistan also have extensive connections with terrorist organizations.
The discussion highlights the complexity of international alliances, showcasing that states can be involved in terrorism while still receiving support from the U.S. for their cooperation against shared enemies like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
The hypocrisy in the geopolitical landscape is laid bare, urging a reevaluation of how certain countries are framed within the global discourse around terrorism.
"After 9/11, the CIA was just killing everybody it didn’t like."
The resumption of aggressive tactics by the CIA following the 9/11 attacks is noted, where strict limitations on assassination were lifted, leading to an expansion of targeted killings.
Executive Order 12333 is discussed, originally amended to justify targeted killings of perceived threats to the United States, showcasing a dramatic shift in policy and operational norms.
This environment fostered a culture within intelligence agencies where success was measured by the ability to eliminate targets, marking a significant departure from earlier constraints on covert actions.
"If I were an Iranian leader or an Iranian intelligence officer, I would be plotting my revenge starting right now."
John Kiriakou expresses his belief that the Iranians are likely formulating a response, especially in light of previous assassinations of prominent figures like General Soleimani, carried out by Israel and the United States.
He suggests that actions taken by the U.S. could instigate a kind of retaliation that could manifest as terrorism in various forms.
"95 times out of 100, these were just crazy people."
Kiriakou recounts his experience as a walk-in officer for the CIA, indicating that the majority of walk-ins, those who approach embassies to share intelligence, often turn out to be unreliable or delusional.
He elaborates on the different categories of walk-ins, noting that among the rare genuine informants, there might be individuals acting as intelligence probes sent by foreign agents to gather information about U.S. operations and security.
"You can recruit beyond Iranian citizenship."
Kiriakou emphasizes that while Iranian sleeper cells are not operational in the U.S., there are certainly Iranian-affiliated individuals in regions with significant Iranian populations, like Dubai or Iraq.
He mentions that various Shia populations in the Middle East, which includes not only Iranians but also Lebanese and Bahrainis, could serve as potential recruits for actions against American interests, particularly as tensions rise in the region.
Kiriakou identifies the likelihood of 'blowback' against U.S. actions, emphasizing that this interconnectedness of regional Shiite groups could escalate retaliatory measures.
