Video Summary
MKUltra-era drug and psychological experiments may have had darker, less-publicized counterparts.
USAID and other aid programs were sometimes used as covert funding or cover for intelligence activities.
Post-2001 Afghanistan shifted from food production to opium—by 2009 producing ~93% of global heroin.
Secrecy and declining congressional oversight after the 1970s enabled abuses and questionable covert operations.
Modern covert tactics include media manipulation and social platforms (e.g., ZunZuneo) to influence foreign publics.
Kiriakou describes alleged CIA operations similar to MKUltra—drugging targets (including LSD in safe houses staged as brothels) and using psychological techniques to extract information. He frames these activities as parallel, darker experiments that remained shrouded in secrecy and limited oversight.
He argues USAID acted as a 'beachhead' for covert activity: funds and small grants were sometimes repurposed or used as cover to funnel money and influence, blurring humanitarian missions with intelligence objectives.
Kiriakou found that large areas of arable land were converted from food crops to opium poppy after the Taliban’s fall, and by 2009 Afghanistan produced roughly 93% of the world’s heroin—an outcome he links to policy choices and local pressure.
He contends that genuine congressional oversight and transparency are the only ways to prevent unethical covert operations; without them, secrecy enables abuses like unwarranted human experimentation, media manipulation, and misdirected foreign policy.
"I paid very little attention to USAID...Every once in a while you'd bump into them in an embassy...but I never had to interact with them."
John Kiriakou reflects on his time in the CIA, noting that he was mostly unaware of USAID's activities. While he occasionally crossed paths with USAID personnel in embassies, he did not engage with them directly or focus on their work during his tenure.
He acknowledges past accusations suggesting that USAID was a front for the CIA, specifically mentioning its financial support to the National Endowment for Democracy, which some believed was involved in money laundering operations.
"After the Taliban were overthrown, they converted all their food production to opium poppy because it's profitable."
Kiriakou details the drastic change in Afghanistan's agricultural landscape following the Taliban's overthrow. Prior to that, Afghanistan was known for being a net food exporter, particularly in the 1970s.
By 2009, the country accounted for 93% of the world's heroin production, which became the focal point of his investigation while working with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
"I said, 'Listen, I'm a senior staffer of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I'm telling you we're going to fly down there.'"
Kiriakou recounts his challenges while attempting to investigate poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Despite facing initial resistance from military officials about traveling to key poppy-growing regions, he ultimately leveraged his position to gain access.
This determination illustrated his commitment to uncovering the truth regarding the opioid crisis tied to U.S. policies in the region.
"The Americans told me in 2001 if I told them where the Arabs were, I could grow all the poppy I wanted."
During his investigation, Kiriakou interviewed a local poppy farmer who expressed frustration over being instructed by American officials to cultivate poppy instead of food crops, suggesting a troubling alliance between local farmers and U.S. interests.
This revelation resulted in immediate concerns from military escorts, leading them to terminate the meeting abruptly, underscoring the sensitive nature of Kiriakou's inquiries.
"It's 93% of the world's poppy, but it all goes to Russia and Iran, and we want them to be addicted to drugs."
After returning from Afghanistan, Kiriakou sought to publish his findings but was warned by a DEA contact that the U.S. government had strategic reasons for allowing the opium trade to flourish in Afghanistan. The intention was to weaken adversaries like Russia and Iran by fostering drug addiction in those regions.
This perspective hints at a larger, more sinister motive behind U.S. actions, revealing the complex interplay of geopolitics and narcotics in the War on Terror.
"There were these little pinpricks of light all over southern Afghanistan. I said, 'What is that? They can't be villages. They're too small.' And he said, 'They're hair processors.'"
"When they were opening up the trucks, he was hiding behind a rock, and he saw the bodies falling out of the trucks, but there were two men there, wearing blue jeans and black t-shirts, and speaking English."
Kiriakou discusses the aftermath of the Dasht-e Leili massacre where 2,000 Taliban soldiers were taken into custody. Due to a lack of resources for detaining such a large number of prisoners, many were unceremoniously packed into shipping containers without food, water, or air, leading to the deaths of almost all but a few. This incident highlights the humanitarian issues associated with military actions during the War on Terror.
He reveals a personal investigation into the massacre after hearing an account from a witness, who claimed to have seen two men speaking English at the scene, raising questions about a possible CIA presence. This confrontation with the agency’s denial of involvement points to deeper issues within operational accountability.
"The only way to fix it is through transparency, real transparency, and true congressional oversight, which we have not had in decades."
Kiriakou emphasizes the need for genuine transparency in government operations, particularly regarding sensitive issues like the MK Ultra program. He argues that despite some operations potentially preventing threats, the existence of unethical practices undermines public trust and accountability.
He points out the conflict between acknowledging both the necessary actions taken for national security and the harmful consequences of certain operations, suggesting that without oversight, harmful practices are likely to continue unchecked.
"They dosed them with LSD... This was like Sidney Gottlieb's experiment."
John Kiriakou discusses the CIA's use of drugging individuals with LSD in a safe house designed to resemble a cathouse. The goal was to extract their innermost secrets, reflecting the unethical methods employed during covert operations.
He highlights that such practices continued until 1975, when the Church and Pike Committees expressed their outrage, leading to the establishment of oversight committees intended to monitor the CIA's operations.
"There hasn't been any real oversight."
Kiriakou expresses concerns about the decline of effective oversight since the initial investigations, particularly pointing out that Bill Casey, the CIA director under Reagan, aimed to minimize Congressional involvement.
This lack of oversight facilitated scandals like Iran-Contra and resulted in a no-confidence vote in 1986, which was passed in such a way to imply that Casey was qualified to continue as director, despite widespread criticisms of his management.
"It was a Democratic product."
Kiriakou critiques the Senate Torture Report for being produced solely by Democratic staff without Republican involvement, leading to a lack of bipartisan accountability.
The Republican counter response touted the moral justification of torture, illustrating the deeply divided political landscape surrounding issues of intelligence and ethics.
"Frank Church was one of those giants of the 20th century."
The conversation touches on Frank Church and the notable efforts made in the 1970s to establish oversight of intelligence activities. Despite their progress, Church lost his subsequent election, illustrating the political peril associated with investigating powerful organizations like the CIA.
Kiriakou laments the absence of influential political figures like Church in today's political arena, suggesting that contemporary politicians lack the fierce independence and dedication to oversight seen in past decades.
"How many other things are they this careless with?"
Kiriakou and his co-host discuss wasteful expenditures by the State Department, hinting at a broader disconnect between budgetary oversight and actual spending habits.
They raise concerns about potentially negligent financial decisions regarding small grants, questioning the broader implications of such mismanagement in terms of lack of accountability and oversight in governmental agencies.
"We shouldn't be imposing our own cultural values on countries that don't want it."
John Kiriakou discusses the tension between American cultural values and those of other countries, particularly regarding LGBTQ rights. He emphasizes the importance of respecting the cultural differences of nations that may not share the same values, suggesting that imposing such beliefs can lead to negative outcomes rather than fostering understanding.
The conversation touches on U.S. efforts to promote diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in different countries, pointing out that initiatives with small budgets, like an $8,000 campaign in Cyprus, can be perceived as patronizing and counterproductive in traditional societies.
"I understand why the United States would want to have things like that."
Kiriakou articulates concerns over soft power strategies employed by the U.S. compared to authoritarian countries like China and Russia, which build infrastructure to gain favor. He argues that these practices should have oversight and not devolve into ineffective and misguided policies.
The dialogue raises questions about the U.S. approach to instilling democracy, citing Afghanistan as a case where their imposed political system clashed with the local culture and established practices.
"Why in blazes did we force Afghanistan into a Western-style democracy when in the 3,000 years of that country's history, they never had one?"
Kiriakou critiques the U.S. decision to impose a Western-style democracy in Afghanistan, noting that the country historically operated under systems like the Loya Jirga, a consultative council of tribal chieftains. He points out that the U.S. disregarded established political traditions in favor of a new system that ultimately did not resonate with the Afghan people.
The conversation condemns the U.S. for disregarding local practices and choosing leaders like Hamid Karzai, which Kiriakou insinuates were merely figureheads without genuine support or understanding of the populace's needs.
"We decided that the police chief in each province would have to come from another province."
Kiriakou recalls a failed policy aimed at combating corruption in Afghanistan, where local police chiefs were assigned from unrelated provinces to reduce nepotism. This strategy, rather than promoting honesty, led to violence against these officials, illustrating the stark disconnect between U.S. policy and local realities.
Through this example, he criticizes the lack of cultural understanding among policymakers in Washington D.C., asserting that many operate without a grasp of the historical or social nuances of the regions they are involved in.
"There is a formal written agreement between the CIA and the State Department addressing cover issues."
John Kiriakou explains that the CIA and the State Department operate under a formal agreement, particularly related to the use of cover identities. This agreement allows for CIA operatives to work under the guise of State Department positions, even though there may not be any substantial support for those roles.
Kiriakou reflects on his own career, revealing that he operated under "nominal cover," meaning he was listed as being with the State Department without any actual verification processes. He underscores that this creates significant complications since actual coordination with the State Department for communication is non-existent.
"There was nothing to back that up. You couldn't call the State Department and say, 'Can I speak to John?'"
Kiriakou notes that despite operating under the cover of the State Department, there was no way for an individual to verify this cover. He explains that while intelligence agencies like the CIA may use organizations like USAID for covert operations, CIA officers are generally not embedded within USAID in a traditional sense.
Moreover, he asserts that covert operations might be funneled through these organizations rather than having direct CIA personnel working within them, highlighting a more complex operational structure.
"USAID was a beachhead for the CIA."
The discussion indicates that the CIA has historically utilized USAID as a mechanism to finance covert operations, undermining the original humanitarian purpose of USAID. Kiriakou elaborates that USAID's mission should be to facilitate international development, not to serve as a tool for covert government activities.
He provides historical context by mentioning a letter written by Senator Ted Kennedy to the CIA regarding payments made to Laotian mercenaries through USAID funds, which underscores the long-standing nature of these operations.
"He would say, 'You know, $5 million to study gay monkeys in Gabon.'"
Kiriakou recalls former Senator William Proxmire, who famously presented a "Golden Fleece Award" to expose government waste, much of which inadvertently pointed to secret CIA funding. Proxmire would highlight instances where the CIA masked its spending within broader budget line items, often under misleading descriptions.
The CIA's budget is reportedly dispersed throughout various federal departments, meaning allocations may not directly correspond to the activities being funded. This camouflage makes it challenging to track the real nature of expenses or to scrutinize them effectively.
"In 2003, we created a Facebook alternative called ZunZuneo."
Kiriakou discusses a more recent example of the CIA’s covert initiatives: ZunZuneo, created to catalyze political unrest in Cuba. This illustrates the agency’s attempts at influencing foreign governments using technology, paralleling scenarios like the Arab Spring.
He emphasizes that these operations often face significant challenges, including failure to attract the target audience, evidenced by the lack of interest from Cubans in signing up for the platform. This highlights the complex dynamics of public engagement in covert operations.
"In 2013, they infiltrated the Bolivian media to try to overthrow Evo Morales by simply buying journalists."
John Kiriakou discusses how covert operations employ tactics like media manipulation to influence political outcomes, illustrating this with an example from Bolivia where journalists were financially incentivized to publish false articles about President Evo Morales.
This kind of manipulation is not isolated; Kiriakou affirms that similar tactics are employed daily across the globe to sway public opinion and destabilize governments.
The rise of technology has made these operations easier but has also diffused their impact by broadening the landscape of who can act as a journalist.
"It happens every day. If we had to steelman something like that, it doesn't sit right with me that you are infecting sources of news that are supposed to be unbiased."
Kiriakou expresses discomfort regarding the ethics of lobbying journalists to craft biased narratives, suggesting such actions undermine the integrity of news sources.
He contrasts this with more overt forms of intervention, pondering whether manipulating media is preferable to violent measures such as funding rebel forces.
The conversation also touches on the challenges of discerning truth in today’s media landscape, where the distinction between fact and fabrication becomes increasingly blurred.
"The narrative is that the Russians essentially bought the 2016 election for Donald Trump, but they spent $50,000 on YouTube ads, none of which were political."
Kiriakou critiques the narrative surrounding Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, stating that much of the supposed evidence of meddling has been proven false.
He explains that the small amount spent on ads was largely innocuous and ineffective, thus challenging the claim of vast conspiracy or influence.
The discussion reveals a broader pattern where many nations engage in similar forms of influence, indicating a commonality in international espionage tactics despite media portrayals.
"When you're collecting intelligence, you send it back to your headquarters, and the analysts go over it."
Kiriakou distinguishes between the oversight existing in traditional intelligence operations and what he perceives as a lack of critical analysis in politically charged environments, particularly referencing the Christopher Steele dossier.
He points out that, when Steele operated independently outside of MI6, he lacked the analytical team necessary to vet the intelligence before it reached the public, leading to the dissemination of potentially dubious information.
This lack of oversight raises questions about the reliability of information used in major political claims, emphasizing the need for discernment in intelligence communities.
"He had what he found, and he didn't have government analysts on the other side."
The subject discusses the typical procedures at MI6, emphasizing the importance of documentation over verification. Intelligence agents would submit their findings without necessarily endorsing them, leaving it up to subsequent analysts to determine their validity.
The process can sometimes lead to a gap in understanding, as agents may pass along information without complete context or confirmation.
"I became the master of the old files on Greek terrorism."
The speaker reveals a deep commitment to uncovering facts related to Greek terrorism, which significantly impacted his personal life, even costing him a marriage due to the obsession.
His thorough investigation involved reviewing extensive archives of files, some dating back 25 years, to identify leads that may have been missed.
"I found a lead. It was a connection between the Greeks and Carlos the Jackal."
Through diligent research, the individual discovered a pivotal connection linking Greek terrorism to the infamous terrorist Carlos the Jackal, a lead that had never been pursued by others.
This discovery prompted him to investigate the whereabouts of a key person who could serve as a middleman in this connection, showcasing the intricacies of international espionage and intelligence work.
"I have identified this guy that I think is the middleman between the Greeks and Carlos the Jackal."
After writing to headquarters with insights about this potential middleman, he was surprised to learn that the individual was living in London under new circumstances, having converted to Christianity and married an English woman.
This development highlights both the ongoing dynamics of international espionage and the personal transformations individuals may undergo, which intelligence agents need to consider in their investigations.
