Why does Galeotti call Putin a '19th‑century geopolitician'?
Because Putin prioritizes coercion, territorial spheres of influence, and great‑power privileges over modern indices of power like technological dynamism or soft influence.
Video Summary
Putin views power as coercion and great‑power privilege, not modern soft power.
Internet repression in Russia is accelerating—mobile outages, VPN targeting, blocked payments.
Digital controls are driven by competing security agencies, straining technocrats and businesses.
Internet disruptions affect civilians and could degrade battlefield communications.
Ukraine’s bottom‑up innovation contrasts with Russia’s ability to scale production but limited technological dynamism.
Because Putin prioritizes coercion, territorial spheres of influence, and great‑power privileges over modern indices of power like technological dynamism or soft influence.
Galeotti says competing security agencies pushing repressive measures—targeting mobile internet, VPNs, and payment apps—are driving the crackdown more than a single coherent policy from the top.
Shutdowns disrupt urban digital lifestyles, payments and everyday communication, and risk degrading frontline communications and coordination—bringing the war’s effects directly into daily life.
No—Galeotti describes the system as strong but brittle: elite fractures and loss of legitimacy increase risk, but the rent‑management structures could outlive Putin absent a triggering black‑swan event.
Ukraine shows bottom‑up, market‑driven innovation tied to battlefield feedback, while Russia can scale production through large industrial capacity but is hampered by vested interests and limited technological dynamism.
"Mark Galiotti is an author and academic specializing in Russian politics and history."
Mark Galiotti is an interdisciplinary scholar whose expertise encompasses politics, criminology, security studies, international relations, and anthropology.
He is recognized as a specialist in transnational and organized crime, as well as Russian politics and history.
Galiotti hosts a highly regarded podcast focused on current events in Russia, particularly the country's repressive measures and the ongoing war.
"Putin's regime has kept Russianists busy for quite some time now."
Galiotti discusses how the current circumstances under Putin have made him a significant focus for scholars studying Russian affairs.
He suggests that part of Putin's displeasure with the West stems from a perceived irrelevance of Russia on the world stage.
The regime is particularly averse to being seen as irrelevant or powerless, leading to aggressive posturing.
"Putin believes Russia is a great power by birthright and deserves certain privileges."
The discussion shifts to how Putin perceives Russia's place in global politics, arguing that he believes Russia should be treated as a great power with inherent rights and privileges.
Galiotti highlights that the West's hesitant acknowledgment of this status has contributed to heightened tensions.
The narrative unfolds that Putin’s aggressiveness can be seen as a defensive reaction against Western policies that he views as dismissive of Russia's importance.
"Putin is a 19th-century geopolitician, valuing power through coercion."
Galiotti describes Putin's view of power as fundamentally influenced by coercion and the ability to maintain a sphere of influence, akin to thinkers from the 19th century.
He differentiates between how power is perceived in the West, where economic influence is also crucial, versus Putin’s more simplistic approach focused on military might and geopolitical dominance.
The impact of Putin’s strategies on Russia’s resources and economy is a focal point, with concerns about sustainability and long-term stability.
"Putin is losing the coherence and legitimacy built around his state."
The commentary stresses that Putin's regime is facing significant challenges, including economic decline and a potential loss of modernity as technology and talented individuals exit Russia.
Galiotti contrasts Putin's earlier presidency, marked by oil wealth and economic health, with the current state where excessive military spending is straining resources.
He predicts a grim future for Russia, characterized by stagnation and decline even with the potential end of the war and Putin's eventual departure from power.
"Putin is the driving force behind this repression of the internet, and actually, in the last couple of days, it seems to be accelerating."
The internet censorship in Russia has intensified recently, with mobile internet services facing significant problems and several websites being taken down.
VPN services are now being targeted for suppression, which is a clear indication of the regime's attempt to control the digital landscape effectively.
The authorities seem to misunderstand the implications of these actions, regarding them as merely an inconvenience, rather than a significant infringement on daily life for many Russians.
"There is not one coherent force in the regime, despite Putin's occasional invocations of the power vertical."
The political structure in Russia operates more like a complex system where various agencies are competing to propose ideas, with Putin often allowing them to execute their plans.
The current internet repression appears to stem from security operators who view the internet as a potential tool for the opposition and foreign influences. This highlights the regime's fear of losing control over information dissemination.
While officials may not see immediate repercussions from their decisions, there's an evident concern among technocrats and the business elite regarding the long-term impacts of these policies on society.
"This is a way in which the war is coming home to ordinary Russians in a way that for many of them it hasn't before."
The shift towards more stringent internet controls will likely affect the routine lives of average Russians more than prior military actions or economic sanctions.
Urban dwellers in Moscow have adapted to a highly digital lifestyle, which makes any disruption to internet services particularly jarring, contrasting with the convenience of other Western cities.
In rural areas, the internet's role shifts from luxury to necessity, particularly for critical communication regarding local services and personal news, indicating a widespread societal impact.
"The Russians have demonstrated extraordinary flexibility and adaptation at a tactical level, if not at an operational doctrinal level."
The adaptability of the Russian military is noteworthy; however, they have not been able to keep pace with Ukrainian advancements.
Russia's advantage lies in its ability to scale up innovations and utilize its extensive industrial capacity.
Despite this scaling ability, a philosophical divide exists within the Russian system, where individual initiatives may be appreciated but ultimately secondary to the interests of state contracts.
"People like Chimizov are perfectly fine with seeing less technological innovation so long as it keeps them dominant in the economy."
Key figures in the Russian elite are more concerned with maintaining economic dominance rather than fostering technological progress.
The relationship between military innovation and industrial interests creates friction, particularly between defense ministry projects and arms manufacturers.
This situation reflects a generational struggle in Russia, pitting advocates of modernization against those who prefer centralized control.
"Ukraine is introducing radical market forces alongside the formalization of a diverse ecosystem, which is more inclined to produce adaptive solutions."
The Ukrainian military-industrial framework allows for significant testing and experimentation, fostering an environment rich in innovation.
This contrasts with Russian practices, suggesting that Ukraine might have a more effective approach to correlating military outcomes with industry performance.
The discussions indicate that Ukraine's ability to mix market dynamics with defense strategies could ultimately yield a competitive edge in the ongoing conflict.
"This war is absolutely the crucible from which a new and different genuine Ukrainian nation has emerged."
The ongoing conflict has catalyzed the formation of a more cohesive Ukrainian national identity, marking a significant evolution from previous attempts at statehood, especially after the Soviet Union's collapse.
Previous efforts at building a Ukrainian identity were largely unsuccessful, often leading to fragmentation and failure. In contrast, the current war has prompted a more profound sense of nationhood.
The Ukrainian military, which had largely unraveled in 2014, has since been rebuilt and is now one of the most powerful armies in Europe, demonstrating the remarkable transformation in Ukraine's defensive capabilities.
"What Ukraine is trying to do is, in a way, to build a new economy while the war is still happening."
The war has not only reshaped the national identity but has also opened avenues for economic redevelopment. By addressing longstanding issues, Ukraine is leveraging the conflict to modernize and innovate.
Drawing parallels to post-war Germany and Italy, the idea is that destruction can provide a fresh start for economic growth and advancement, even amidst ongoing conflict.
Despite acknowledging the devastation the war brings, there is potential for positive outcomes, fostering both economic and cultural dynamism in Ukraine.
"It seems to be going backwards. It seems to be stripping away some of the layers of development that have been happening since the 1990s."
While the war has been transformative for Ukraine, it has had the opposite effect in Russia, leading to a regression in civic society and the suppression of freedoms.
Russian society has not seen the emergence of a powerful civic movement as a response to the war. Instead, there is a network of dark civic activity that supports detrimental governmental actions.
The situation reflects a deterioration of the previously established layers of development, hinting at a broader trend towards repression and lack of dissent within the Russian state.
"I just don't believe that Remis sat down one day and wrote this highly coherent critique of Putin."
Recent criticism of the Russian regime by figures previously aligned with it raises questions about internal dynamics and the possible end of Putin's tenure.
Speculation surrounds whether the critiques are genuine reflections of dissent or strategic provocations intended to expose discontent within the regime.
The situation highlights a wider confusion and uncertainty among the Russian populace regarding the stability of Putin's regime, suggesting a loss of grip on power and governance.
"No one really knows which way it's going to go."
The current state of civil society in Russia is marked by significant uncertainty, largely due to the lack of optimism among the populace.
People do not feel empowered to protest, as there is a prevailing sense of dismay about the regime's stability, which contrasts with any hope for change.
This ambivalence reflects a fragmented society, particularly among the educated elite, who play a crucial role in both supporting and managing the regime.
"These are the people who are saying, 'What the hell is going on?'"
Members of the educated elite are expressing their confusion and concern about the direction of the regime, indicating that even those who typically support it are questioning the status quo.
As this discontent grows, it could undermine the regime's foundation by revealing fractures within its support system.
"People are triggered when their sense of personal privilege is challenged."
The reaction against the war and government actions tends to increase when individuals feel their privileges are at stake, rather than when abstract rights are threatened.
The situation is not unique to Russia; it reflects a broader human tendency to react more strongly when personal interests are affected than when facing generalized injustices.
"This is a regime which so often manages to mess things up by just the most basic minor things."
The regime's management of propaganda and media narratives is failing to resonate with the public, as they see through efforts to frame current challenges as noble or necessary struggles.
The ongoing disconnect between the government's narratives and the people's realities suggests that the state's efforts to legitimize its actions—like the war in Ukraine—are increasingly seen as dubious.
"This raises questions about the actual impact on the front."
Communication systems and internet access have become critical for military effectiveness, indicating that any disruptions could significantly affect operations on the battlefield.
The conversation around internet control highlights the balance between the need for censorship and the logistical realities faced by the Russian military.
"Putin is creating options for himself by creating this extraordinary slide to a further repressive measure."
This move towards advanced repression allows Putin to maintain flexibility in his decision-making regarding the war, balancing pressures from hardliners and the need for public support.
His approach indicates a tactical opportunism rather than strategic foresight, as he shifts between different narratives to suit prevailing circumstances without committing to a definitive course of action.
"Putin will always maintain opportunities, but I still don't think this is ultimately something that comes from the top."
The dynamics in Russia today are increasingly shaped by various interest groups, each with stakes in the country's direction, while Putin reserves the right to pivot as needed.
The existing tensions and the diverging interests of the elite and technocrats reflect a complicated relationship with the war that binds their professional lives to state outcomes, revealing contradictions in their support.
"The Russians have demonstrated themselves to be astonishingly incapable of predicting problems before they happen and being ready for them."
The Russian security apparatus appears to be focused on expanding their own opportunities while failing to adequately prepare for potential challenges.
Although they struggle with anticipation, they often cobble together responses to crises as they arise.
"If they can control the internet and the whitelists of those sites which are still able to be contacted, they can metaphorically sit back and say, 'What will you pay me to get your URL on that whitelist?'"
The regime's control over the internet allows them to exert influence and generate revenue by managing access to online platforms.
This behavior exemplifies the self-destructive nature of the current regime, highlighting how its institutions compete economically while maintaining coercion and control.
"This is a system that is very likely to outlive Putin, and there isn't this fervor to tear apart the power vertical and destroy this rent management kind of system."
Contrary to the idea of an imminent revolution in Russia, the regime is more stable than many believe, operating on a foundation that could endure even after Putin's departure.
While some individuals recognize the disastrous nature of the war, their motivations vary from self-interest to a practical acknowledgment of the regime's dysfunction.
"This is a system which is getting more brittle. It's strong, but it's brittle."
The regime exhibits signs of brittleness despite its apparent strength, losing support from various factions that previously upheld it.
Notably, during the recent PGI mutiny, various security entities refrained from resisting or joining forces to defend the regime, indicating a declining loyalty or motivation among security personnel.
"If there is some kind of black swan event... it's not that people would immediately take to the streets to bring the regime down."
The specter of sudden events, such as a natural disaster or the incapacitation of Putin, could instigate a significant shift within the regime.
However, the response from those tasked with maintaining the regime stability may be more apathetic than revolutionary, possibly leading them to observe rather than act decisively.
"Whoever comes in, if they were to restore the privilege of the urban population by restoring elements of the internet... they'd probably be embraced quickly."
In a post-Putin landscape, the populace may not seek radical systemic changes but rather a return to their previous privileges, such as access to the internet.
This desire for restored privileges could lead to a quick embrace of a new regime that allows for greater personal freedoms and opportunities.